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ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this appeal, Kalani-Keegan does not dispute the "Course of 
Proceedings" and "Statement of Facts" sections of the Appellant's Brief, with the 
following exception. The Department states, "On June 14, 2011 Trooper Donahue signed 
his Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of the Arrest. His affidavit was notarized by 
Dorie Mallory and sent to lTD." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). Kalani-Keegan does not 
concede this point to the extent it conflicts with the Hearing Officer's findings and 
conclusions pertaining to the probable cause affidavit, which were as follows: 
1. Idaho Code §18-8002A(5)(b) provides that within five business days 
following service of a notice of suspension the peace officer shall forward 
to the department, among other things, a sworn statement of the officer, 
which may incorporate any arrest or incident reports relevant to the arrest. 
2. The probable cause affidavit acts as the sworn statement of the officer. 
3. Exhibit 2, the probable cause affidavit, does not contain the original 
signature of the police officer, thereby invalidating the notary certificate 
which follows. 
4. The probable cause affidavit does not meet the requirements of Idaho 
Code. 
5. Therefore, the required documents were not forwarded to the 
Department in compliance with Idaho Code. 
(R. p. 46). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Department precluded from raising the issue that its substantial rights have 
been prejudiced because it did not assert the issue before the District Court? 
2. Is Kalan i-Keegan entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117 (l) because the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law? 
3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The applicable standard of review can be found in Wilkinson v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 151 Idaho 784. 264 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 2011), wherein the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the 
review of ITD decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or 
restrict a person's driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 
67-5270. In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its 
appellate capacity under IDAP A, this Court reviews the agency record 
independently of the district court's decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of 
Transp., 117 Id<!hQ.]37, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This Court 
does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence presented. I.e. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 
P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 
.923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 - .---------
P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are 
binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence 
before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine 
Coun~y, ex reI. Bd. ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738,742 
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
The Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, 
inferences. conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional 
provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon 
unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.e. § 67-
5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that 
the agency erred in a manner specified in I.e. § 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette Counry 
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 258 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not 
affirmed on appeal, " it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further 
proceedings as necessary." I.e. § 67-5279(3). 
Wilkinson v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 151 Idaho at 786. Further, an Appellate Court freely 
reviews the District Court's conclusions of law. Hawkins v. Bonneville Counry Bd. of 




THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION MUST BE UPHELD BECAUSE THE 
DEP ARTMENT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE. 
The Department has first argued that the Hearing Officer did not have the legal 
authority to vacate Kalani-Keegan's license suspension. However, given the District 
Court's ruling, a more logical starting point should be the issue of whether the District 
Court acted in error in concluding there was no prejudice to a substantial right shown. For 
if there was no error, the issue of whether the Hearing Officer acted appropriately need 
not be addressed. Accordingly, Kalani-Keegan first addresses the Department's 
contention that there was error in the lower court. 
The District Court ruled, in its Memorandum Decision entered June 5, 2012, that the 
Department had not demonstrated that a substantial right had been prejudiced, and thus, 
the Hearing Officer's decision, (vacating Kalani-Keegan's driver's license suspension), 
should be affirmed. It therefore declined to review the remaining issues, citing Kirk-
Hughes Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. a/County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 
237 P.3d 652 (Idaho 2010). This ruling was supported by the record before the Court and 
existing Idaho law. 
The party seeking relief from an agency decision must be able to establish that its 
substantial rights have been prejudiced because of the agency's actions. Subsection (4) of 
Idaho Code § 67 -5279 provides: 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
5 
section, agency action shall be affinned unless substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced. 
Thus, even if the Department could establish that the Hearing Officer erred in a manner 
prescribed by I.e. § 67-5279(3), it still could not have prevailed on appeal to the District 
Court unless it also successfully demonstrated that the substantial rights of the 
Department had been prejudiced. See e.g. Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 
36,981 P.2d 1146 (1999). The burden is on the party contesting an agency decision to 
show how the agency erred in a manner specified under § 67-5279 and to establish that a 
substantial right has been prejudiced. Wheeler v. Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare. 147 
Idaho 257,207 P.3d 988 (2009). Further, "[T]he Court may forego analyzing whether the 
governing board erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner cannot 
show that his or her substantial rights were violated." Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. 
of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,232,254 P.3d 1224 (Idaho 2011); see also Kirk-Hughes 
Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 558, 237 
P.3d 652 (Idaho 2010). 
In the appeal proceedings before the District Court, the Department never presented 
any argument that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. Indeed, as the District Court 
noted, "The Department has not alleged. much less established, that any of its substantial 
rights were prejudiced by the Hearing Officer's decision." (R. p. 79). The District Court 
therefore appropriately declined to review the remaining issues, pursuant to Kirk-Hughes 
Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555,237 P.3d 
652 (Idaho 2010). The Department notes in its briefing to this Court that it disagrees with 
the holding and analysis of the District Court. However, on appeal to this Court, the 
Department has failed to demonstrate why the decision by the District Court was 
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erroneous. In the Department's briefing to the District Court, the Department did not 
present any argument that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. Faced with no 
argument on the point the District Court ruled as it should have. It is not the District 
Court's obligation to craft legal arguments for a party, when that party has failed to do so 
on their own. 
The Department has failed to establish that the District Court erred in finding that no 
prejudice had been shown. Accordingly, the District Court's Memorandum Decision 
must be upheld. Issues cited on appeal that are not properly supported by propositions of 
law, authority or argument are not considered. Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC v. 
Kootenai County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 149 Idaho 555,237 P.3d 652 (Idaho 2010); see 
also, Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224 
(Idaho 2011), wherein the District Court's dismissal was upheld on appeal because the 
appellant did not show that the District Court erred in finding no prejudice. 
II. 
NO PREJUDICE TO A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT HAS BEEN SHOWN. 
The Department argues that the Hearing Officer was wrong when he failed to consider 
the Mallory statement and reverse his decision, and that this violated the substantial rights 
of the Department. Even if this argument is considered on appeal, it is without merit. 
First, the record does not establ ish that the Hearing Officer failed to consider the 
Mallory statement. The record simply does not bear out whether the Hearing Officer 
considered the Mallory statement, and elected not to act, or did not consider it at all. 
According to the Department's Final Order, if the Hearing Officer fails to act upon a 
motion for reconsideration within twenty-one days of its receipt, the motion will be 
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deemed denied, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5243(3). (R. p. 48). In this case, the Hearing 
Officer did not issue a written opinion on the motion for reconsideration, but did enter an 
Order dated September 20, 2011 recognizing that he had not acted on the motion within 
ten days and that therefore, the motion was deemed denied. (R. p. 68). 
Second, the Department cites to two IDAPA rules, (IDAPA 04.1l.01.052 and IDAPA 
04.11.01.600), and points out that the Mallory statement did not need to be in affidavit 
form. While the rules cited by the Department undoubtedly promote efficiency and 
fairness, they certainly do not dictate the weight to be accorded to a particular piece of 
evidence such as the Mallory statement, and do not mandate that the Hearing Officer 
reverse in this particular case. 
Third, while the Mallory statement recites that Trooper Donahue signed the PC 
Affidavit in her presence on June 10, 2011, it does not state that it was the same 
document forwarded to the Department. 
Finally, the determination by the Hearing Officer of whether the Trooper's affidavit 
did or did not contain an original signature is a factual matter that should not be disturbed 
on appeal. As noted by the Court in Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 
206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009): 
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1): Marshall, 137 Idaho 
at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 
l;lQ Idaho_923, 926,250 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 
340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations 
are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by 
substantial competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex 
8 
rei. Bd. ojComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, U.3dZ38, 742 (2000): 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009). 
The finding that the probable cause affidavit did not contain the original signature of 
the police officer is a factual finding made by the Hearing Officer based apparently upon 
his observation of the document. To reverse and remand based upon the Mallory 
statement, this Court would need to overturn the Hearing Officer on a factual issue. 
III. 
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT RAISE THE ARGUMENT THAT ITS 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS WERE PREJUDICED TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
BELOW; CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS PRECLUDED FROM DOING SO NOW. 
Another reason that the District Court's decision must be upheld is because the 
Department's argument that its substantial rights were prejudiced, was not raised by the 
Department in the appeal to the District Court. Generally speaking, "An issue not raised 
below will not be considered when raised for the first time on appeal." Lawton v. City oj 
Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 464, 886 P.2d 330,340 (1994); Post Falls Trailer Park v. 
Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634,962 P.2d 1018 (1998). Then Chief Justice Eismann alluded to 
this very idea in his special concurring opinion in Hawkins v. Bonneville Coun£v Bd. of 
Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P .3d 1224 (2011). when he said: 
In Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC v. Kootenai Coun(v Board oj 
Commissioners, 149 Idaho 555,237 P.3d 652 (2010), and in the instant 
case, the issue was raised in the District Court, and the court found that the 
appellant's substantial rights had not been prejudiced. We affirmed the 
District Court's dismissal of the petition for judicial review in Kirk-
Hughes because the appellant did not address on appeal to this Court the 
District Court's finding of no prejudice, and we affirm the District Court's 
dismissal here because the appellant did not show that the District Court 
erred in finding no prejudice. I do not understand the majority opinion to 
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hold that this Court would decide an appeal based upon the appellant's 
failure to show prejudice to substantial rights unless that issue had been 
raised in the District Court. 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232. 254 P.3d 1224 
(2011). Because the issue of prejudice was not raised by the Department in the 
appeal to the District Court, the Department is precluded from raising it now. 
IV. 
THE HEARING OFFICER HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO VACATE THE 
LICENSE SUSPENSION. 
In its briefing. the Department argues that there are only five grounds upon which a 
hearing officer may vacate a license suspension, and that none of the five grounds 
concern the adequacy of documentation sent to lTD by the initiating law enforcement 
officer, citing I.C. §18-8002A(7). The Department further argues that, at the ALS 
hearing, the burden of proof was on Kalani-Keegan. These arguments fail however, 
because the officer's sworn statement is fatally and materially defective, and therefore. 
the burden never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to establish one of the five enumerated 
grounds. 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(5) (b) mandates that a sworn statement be submitted by the 
peace officer, and that sworn statement contain certain elements: 
(b) Within five (5) business days following service of a notice of 
suspension the peace officer shall forward to the department a copy of the 
completed notice of suspension form upon which the date of service upon 
the driver shall be clearly indicated, a certified copy or duplicate original 
of the results of all tests for alcohol concentration, as shown by analysis of 
breath administered at the direction of the peace officer, and a sworn 
statement of the officer, which may incorporate any arrest or incident 
reports relevant to the arrest and evidentiary testing setting forth: 
(1) The identity of the person; 
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Oi) Stating the officer's legal cause to stop the person: 
(iii) Stating the officer's legal cause to believe that the person had 
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004. 18-
8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
(iv) That the person was advised of the consequences of taking and 
failing the evidentiary test as provided in subsection (2) of this 
section; 
(v) That the person was lawfully arrested; 
(vi) That the person was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances as provided in this chapter, and that the 
results of the test indicated an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
(emphasis added). If a sworn statement is submitted that is materially deficient. then the 
burden does not shift to the person requesting the hearing to establish one of the grounds 
set forth in I.e. § 18-8002A(7). The concept of burden shifting was discussed in Druffel v. 
State, Depr. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002), wherein this Court explained: 
The arresting officer observed Druffet's erratic driving pattern, noticed 
Druffel's speech was slurred and smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming 
from Druffel, and watched Druffel fail the field sobriety tests. Druffel then 
consented to the Intoxilizer test, which produced BAC results greater than 
the legal limit. In addition, the calibration, certification and quality control 
of the Intoxilizer test all met the required standards thus the affidavit of the 
arresting officer was sufficient to shift the burden to Druffel. 
(emphasis added), Druffel. 136 Idaho at 856. 
In the case at bar, the Hearing Officer made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pertaining to the probable cause affidavit: 
1. Idaho Code §18-8002A(5)(b) provides that within five business days 
following service of a notice of suspension the peace officer shall forward 
to the department, among other things, a sworn statement of the officer, 
which may incorporate any arrest or incident reports relevant to the arrest. 
2. The probable cause affidavit acts as the sworn statement of the officer. 
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3. Exhibit 2, the probable cause affidavit, does not contain the original 
signature of the police officer. thereby invalidating the notary certificate 
which follows. 
4. The probable cause affidavit does not meet the requirements of Idaho 
Code. 
5. Therefore, the required documents were not forwarded to the 
Department in compliance with Idaho Code. 
(R. p. 46). 
Because, as the Hearing Officer found, the affidavit was not compliant with the 
requirements of Idaho Code, due to the lack of an original signature thereon, the burden 
never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to establish one of the grounds for relief enumerated in 
I.e. 18-8002A(7), as this was a material defect in the affidavit. 
The Department also argues that, "Assuming the sufficiency of the officer's signature 
was at issue, it was the petitioner's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence. 
that the officer's signature was flawed. She failed. The record contains no evidence 
challenging the officer's signature." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 6). This argument fails for two 
reasons. As previously noted, the burden never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to prove 
anything. because the Hearing Officer determined the affidavit did not meet the 
requirements of Idaho Code. Second, even if it was Kalani-Keegan's burden, the burden 
was met by virtue of evidence in the record. The Hearing Officer presumptively had 
possession of. or access to, the original copies of the documents that were sent to the 
Department. including the sworn statement. He made a factual determination, apparently 
based upon his own observation, that the affidavit did not contain the original signature 
of the police officer. Thus his findings and conclusions were supported by evidence in the 
record. That this issue was raised by the Hearing Officer, rather than counsel, is 
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immaterial. 
The Department cites to Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp. , 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 
(Idaho App. 2003). Kane is distinguishable. Kane had argued at his ALS hearing that the 
administrative license suspension was invalid because: (1) Officer Erickson's affidavit 
submitted to the lTD was on the wrong form and thus did not meet the requirement of 
I.e. § 18-8002A(5) that the sworn statement be made "on forms in accordance with rules 
adopted by the department"; (2) in addition to being on the wrong form, Officer 
Erickson's affidavit did not contain all of the information required by I.e. § 18-8002A(5). 
Precisely what information was allegedly lacking from the affidavit is not specified. With 
regard to the affidavit issue, the Hearing Officer concluded that the officer's affidavit did 
comply with statutory requirements. On judicial review, the District Court affirmed the 
Hearing Officer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that "Section 18-8002A(7) 
specifies that the hearing officer "shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds "one of 
the five enumerated bases to set aside a suspension. Therefore, a hearing officer is not 
authorized to vacate a suspension based upon technical flaws in documents delivered to 
the ITD." The Court also stated that it was Kane's "burden to prove that, infact, the 
officer lacked legal cause to stop Kane's vehicle or that the blood test was, infact. not 
conducted in accordance with legal requirements. This burden is not met by merely 
showing that documents in the hands of the ITD are inadequate or inadmissible to reveal 
whether legal cause existed or whether the blood test was conducted properly." 
The case at bar does not involve questions about "technical flaws" in a document 
delivered to lTD, nor about whether Kalani-Keegan met her burden at hearing. Rather, 
the issue presented here is whether the burden ever shifted to Kalani-Keegan because of 
13 
the materially defective sworn statement. Kalani-Keegan respectfully contends it did not. 
v. 
KALANI-KEEGAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-117(1). 
Kalani-Keegan is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal as the Department! 
has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Code § 12-117(1), which 
provides authority for such an award, states: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the 
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, 
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's 
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Clearly under the new amendments to the statute, the legislature intended that it apply to 
appeals such as this one. As amended, Idaho Code 12-1l7(S)(c) provides: 
(c) "Proceeding" means any administrative proceeding, administrative 
judicial proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for judicial review 
or any appeal from any administrative proceeding, administrative judicial 
proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for judicial review. 
1 The Department of Transportation is clearly a "state agency"' as contemplated by I.e. § 12-117. The term 
"state agency" is defined in Idaho Code § 12-117(5)(d) as "any agency as defined in section 67-5201, Idaho 
Code". Under I.e. § 67-5201(2), ""Agency" means each state board, commission. department or officer 
authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but does not include the legislative or 
judicial branches, executive officers listed in section 1. article IV, of the constitution of the state of Idaho in 
the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively from the constitution, the state militia or the state 
board of correction." There is no question that the Department is authorized by law to make rules, (See I.e. 
lS-S002A; IDAPA 39.02.72 "Rules Governing Administrative License Suspensions") and is authorized to 
determine contested cases (See I.C. §§ lS-S002A(l)(f). lS-S002A(7)). (Under I.e. §67-5201 (6), a 
""Contested case" means a proceeding which results in the issuance of an order.·' I.e. §67 -5240 further 
provides, "A proceeding by an agency, other than the public utilities commission or the industrial 
commission, that may result in the issuance of an order is a contested case and is governed by the 
provisions of this chapter. except as provided by other provisions of law.") 
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This Court discussed the post-amendment version of Idaho Code § 12-117 in the 
case of In re Jerome County Board o/Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 
1076 (2012): 
Thus, this statute now requires this Court on appeal to award a prevailing 
party reasonable attorney fees if we find that the nonprevailing party did 
not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law on appeal. See also Reardon 
v. City 0/ Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004) rev'd on 
other grounds. City o/Osburn 1'. Randel, Idaho _,277 P.3d 353 (2012». 
In re Jerome County Board o.fCommissioners, 281 P.3d at 1095-1096. 
Some examples of instances wherein the Court found that a party did not act with a 
reasonable basis in fact or law on appeal have included, a Board of County 
Commissioners acting contrary to an unambiguous state statute and a local ordinance in 
Gardiner v. Boundary County Bd. o.fCom'rs, 148 Idaho 764, 229 P.3d 369 (Idaho 2010); 
an unreasonable construction of a statute advanced in Daw ex reI. Daw v. School Dist. 91 
Bd. o.fTrustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (Idaho 2001); and a situation wherein 
appellants "were very clearly aware of the statutory procedures, failed to appeal separate 
appraisals when they had a right to appeal, and were clearly advised on the applicable law 
in an articulate and well reasoned written decision from the District Court", yet "chose to 
further appeal that decision to this Court, even though they failed to add any new analysis 
or authority to the issues raised below" in Castringo v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d 
419 (Idaho 2005). 
In the case at bar, Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) is clear and unambiguous, mandating that, 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action 
shall be affirmed unless substantial rights o.f the appellant have been prejudiced." 
(emphasis added). As recognized by the District Court in a clear and well founded 
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opinion, the Department never alleged, much less established, that substantial rights had 
been prejudiced. This was plainly the Department's burden to establish, but it failed to 
advance any argument on the point to the District Court. The District Court was therefore 
clearly correct in its decision. In spite of this fact, the Department frivolously appealed to 
this Court, raising its prejudice argument for the first time here. but wholly failing to 
establish why the District Court acted in error. Under these circumstances, the 
Department has acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. and an award of 
attorney's fees and costs is appropriate. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department has failed to show that the District Court erred in concluding the 
Department had not established prejudice to its substantial rights in the proceedings 
below. Even were the Department successful in so doing, it has not shown to this Court 
that its substantial rights were in fact prejudiced. Additionally, the Department failed to 
raise the issue of prejudice to substantial rights in the District Court below, and is 
precluded from raising that issue in this appeal. Finally, the Hearing Officer did act 
within his authority in vacating Kalani-Keegan's license suspension, as the affidavit did 
not comply with the requirements of the Idaho Code due to the fact the affidavit did not 
bear the original signature of the officer. This was a material defect, and thus the burden 
never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to establish one of the five enumerated bases to set aside 
a suspension. Accordingly, the District Court's decision, and the Hearing Officer's 
findings and conclusions. must be upheld. Finally, Kalani-Keegan is entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117, because the 
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Department, on appeal, has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -U- day of December, 2012. 
GREGKOR~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
Marina P. Kalani-Keegan 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing by regular 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this ZL day of December, 2012. to: 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
By sAil ~ 
Greg D. Home 
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